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Abstract 
 
Under what circumstances does giving a voice and explanation to a manager in a budget 
allocation setting improve their performance? The research into whether or not managers 
should participate or have a voice in setting their budget allocation show conflicting results on 
performance. This seems largely as a result of the variables being measured in importantly 
different ways. Whether or not the voice influences the final budget allocation and whether 
the budget is perceived as unfair, unfavourable or unattainable needs to be clearly articulated 
in the research design. 
 
This study demonstrates that the circumstances in which voice and explanation improve 
performance depend on whether or not the budget allocation is perceived as unfair. To date, it 
has been accepted practice that managers should participate in the budget setting process. 
However, it may be better to set a budget and explain its rationale. Over multiple budget 
periods care should be taken with the type of explanation given, because simply repeating last 
year‟s reason will discourage higher performance. 
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1. Introduction 
The invasive consequences of budget allocations into every area of organisational life mean 
the budget process is a highly focused one. Indeed the importance of the budget process has 
been demonstrated by the amount of practitioner and academic literature dedicated to the 
topic. Libby (1999) pointed out the importance of studying the budget process under realistic 
circumstances by examining a consultative budgeting process. This study seeks to extend this 
realism by examining Libby‟s (1999) consultative budgeting process over multiple budget 
periods.  
 
The study of subordinate participation in the budgeting process has attracted a lot of attention 
however, as Shields and Young (1993) pointed out many of the empirical findings are 
inconsistent. Shields and Shields (1998) suggest that this is due to inter-study variation and  
the inadequate recognition of antecedents. Libby (1999) joined Shields and Shields (1998) in 
criticising the participation in budgeting literature by outlining that many experimental 
participation in budgeting studies assume that “organisations exist in a world of infinite 
resources and all individuals and organisational subunits can be allocated the amount of 
resources they request” (Libby, 1999, 125). Libby motivated her study by arguing that 
participative budgeting research assumes a subordinate can choose their budget target, 
however in reality a consultative budgeting process is practised whereby subordinates have an 
opportunity to provide input, however, the final budget allocation is decided by the superior 
(Vroom 1983). This is in line with other researchers who suggest there are two dimensions to 
participation in budgeting which are communication/involvement and influence (Otley et al. 
1994; Hassell and Cunningham 1993). 
 
Libby (1999), applying organisational justice theory, examined the effect of voice and 
explanation on performance within a budget setting. Libby argued when a manager‟s 
involvement in the budget process (voice) did not influence the final budget allocation, the 
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communication of a justification (explanation) will reduce the negative consequences 
compared to when no justification (explanation) is given. Libby‟s hypothesis was supported.  
 
Libby‟s study was conducted using a static budget setting. However, in reality, the budget 
process occurs continuously, with budget periods at least yearly. It is argued in this paper that 
the continual rejection of the subordinate‟s input from one budget period to the next, despite 
the receipt of an explanation, could diminish the positive effect of the explanation, thus 
leading to the perception that the budgeting process is pseudo-participative which would 
negatively affect performance.  
 
Argyris (1952) defines a pseudo-participative process as one in which the subordinates are led 
to believe that they have influence over the budget that is set, but in reality their input is 
ignored. This perception of a pseudo-participative budgeting process can lead to de-
motivating effects on subordinates‟ performance (Pasewark and Welker, 1990). Further, it is 
advanced that not all explanations would be equal. The type of explanation received would 
affect performance. To demonstrate, this study also examines the effect on performance of 
simply receiving the same or different explanations over multiple budget periods. More 
specifically, it is hypothesized that the same explanation used over and over again would 
severely impact on the positive effect of the explanation thus negating any of the beneficial 
effects on performance provided by the receipt of an explanation.  
 
Using an experimental research design this study replicates Libby‟s (1996, 1999) experiment 
over multiple budget periods and examines the differences in performance of subjects 
receiving the same versus a different explanation. The results show a significant main 
explanation effect and no significant voice and explanation interaction effect on performance. 
This is contrary to Libby (1996, 1999) who found no significant main effects but a significant 
voice and explanation interaction effect on performance. Failure to replicate Libby (1999) 
provides an opportunity to explore the reasons for the difference. Insights gained from this 
exploration confirmed that perceived fairness and performance are related. In many studies 
this connection is assumed, however in this study empirical evidence is provided. The results 
also highlight that the effects of voice and explanation on performance are sensitive to the 
budget set. Clarity in the research design regarding the fairness and attainability of the budget 
goal is paramount. This finding is important given the call for careful study design by Shields 
and Shields (1998) if a theory on participation in the budget setting process is to develop.  
 
The results also confirm previous research in two ways. They reinforce the importance of an 
explanation and also show support for the pseudo-participation phenomenon – that an 
uninfluential voice, despite receiving an explanation, negatively affects performance. 
 
Further, this research shows that over multiple budget periods those subjects receiving a 
different explanation performed significantly better than those subjects receiving the same 
explanation.  However, the hypothesised effect on performance over time was not significant. 
The advantage of explaining a decision stems from its ability to counter any negative thoughts 
of unfairness. Greenberg (1991) argues that convincing others of ones fairness is more 
important then in actually behaving fairly. The results obtained in this research add to this line 
of enquiry by showing empirically that it is simply not a matter of just giving an explanation 
but that the type of explanation does impact on performance and fairness. Further work is 
now needed to establish the attributes of an explanation that are the most important. 
 
In the following section the literature is reviewed and the hypotheses presented. The third 
section outlines the research method and the results are presented in the forth section. The 
conclusion, implications and future research is discussed in the final section.  
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2. Literature review and hypotheses 
This study is based on organisational justice theory. The central contention of organisational 
justice is that employees who are treated unfairly are less productive, less satisfied, and less 
loyal to their organisations (Sheppard et al.1992). There are three dimensions of 
organisational justice theory (Bies and Tripp 1995; Beugré 1998). They are: 
1. Distributive justice - how outcomes should be allocated;  
2. Procedural justice - the procedures that should be used to make decisions; and  
3 Interactional justice - how people should be treated interpersonally. 
 
 
Fig. 1 
Organisational Justice Variables Influence Perceived Fairness and Performance 
 
 
Figure 1 contains a diagram of the variables of interest in this study. Generally, the three 
dimensions of organisational justice have been examined in relation to two main dependent 
variables. They are perceived fairness and performance. The diagram also contains a link 
between perceived fairness and performance.  In the procedural fairness literature there is an 
implied theoretical model indicating that fairness motivates effort and commitment thus 
increasing performance. The importance of perceived fairness has been highlighted in a wide 
variety of organisational settings, including performance appraisals (Greenberg 1986, 1991; 
Sheppard and Lewicki 1987; Dulebohn and Ferris 1999), budget decisions (Bies and Shapiro 
1988), the allocation of scarce resources (Barrett-Howard and Tyler 1986), and performance 
monitoring (Niehoff and Moorman 1993).  
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The focus of this study was on the procedural and interactional justice dimensions in a budget 
setting.
1
 When individuals receive unfavourable outcomes (distributive justice), they then 
judge the fairness of that outcome on the process (procedural and interactional justice) by 
which the outcome was determined (Thibaut and Walker 1975). Although, several studies 
have examined procedural justice and interactional justice, there has been surprisingly little 
research investigating their combined effect. Further, a literature search found no prior 
empirical studies examining their use over multiple time periods.  
 
Procedural justice has been mainly examined through the element of voice. Leventhal (1980) 
defined voice as the ability of subordinates to be involved in a decision process by 
communicating their views to their superiors. People seek to voice their opinion in the 
decision process because it allows them a chance to influence the outcomes or decision 
processes that affect them (Leventhal 1980; Brett 1986; Beugré, 1998; Williams 1999). The 
provision of voice has been studied in relation to its effect on perceived fairness (Thibaut and 
Walker 1975; Dipboye and de Pontbriand 1981; Greenberg 1986; Tyler 1987) and on 
performance (Lind et al. 1990; Lindquist 1995; Chow et al. 1996). Overall, the evidence 
suggests that the provision of a voice in the decision process increases positively the 
perceptions of fairness and performance.  
 
Interactional justice consists of two aspects, the provision of an explanation for a decision and 
the interpersonal treatment an individual receives during the decision process (Tyler and Bies 
1990; Gilliland 1993). Explanation is defined as a justification provided by the superior when 
the outcome of the decision process was not influenced by the subordinates‟ input (Bies 
1987).  Investigations into the provision of an explanation have primarily been concerned 
with its effect on fairness judgments and subordinates‟ perceptions of fairness (Bies 1987; 
Bies and Shapiro 1987, 1988; Greenberg 1991). Generally, this research has found that the 
provision of an explanation improves perceptions of fairness (Bies and Moag 1986; Bies and 
Shapiro 1987, 1988). Although some of these studies have also investigated the effects of 
voice, this effect was found to be independent of the explanation effect. Only recently, has 
research begun to investigate the effect of an explanation on performance (Libby 1996, 1999; 
Williams 1999). 
 
Williams (1999) found that providing subjects with a voice did not affect performance but 
that the provision of an explanation improved performance. Libby (1996, 1999) found that 
neither voice nor explanation had an independent effect on performance but there was an 
interaction effect between voice and explanation affecting performance. The absence of main 
effects of voice and explanation is curious and deserves further investigation. Contrary to 
Libby (1996, 1999) and Williams (1999), Lind et al. (1990), Lindquist (1995) and Chow et al. 
(1996) found the provision of voice had positive significant effects on performance. One 
possible explanation for the conflicting results is the influence of the voice in each of the 
studies. For example, Libby‟s experimental design was such that voice did not influence the 
decision whereas in Lindquist the voice did influence the decision.  The conflicting results 
could be explained by the pseudo-participation phenomenon whereby once an individual is 
asked to participate in decision making they expect that their contribution will be utilized 
otherwise demotivation results. It is also unknown as to whether the benefit of an explanation 
would be the same over multiple time periods. This is an important consideration because the 
budgeting process occurs over multiple time periods. Given that research investigating the 
effect of explanation on performance is embryonic a suitable form of advancement would be 
a replication type study. Replication is considered a foundation for all scientific work 
(Popper, 1959) and has a major role in exploring the firmness of conclusions found (Otley et 
al. 1994). Otley and Pollanen (2000) have also argued that results should be replicable before 
extensions into new areas are progressed.  
 
This study attempts to replicate Libby‟s (1999) study over multiple time periods. Libby based 
her hypothesis on the two component model of justice developed by Cropanzao and Folger 
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(1991). Libby (1999) argued that when the distribution of the budget allocation is perceived 
as unfair, performance will improve when the subordinates perceive the allocation process as 
fair (voice plus explanation) compared to when subordinates perceive the allocation process 
as unfair (voice without explanation). That is, in Libby‟s study the subjects were given an 
unfair budget allocation to ensure they concentrated on the process. She then manipulated the 
voice and explanation variables to capture what she describes as an unfair or fair budget 
process. 
 
Although Libby‟s (1999) hypothesis only refers to the voice condition, an interaction was 
proposed between voice and explanation. The form of the interaction, presented in Figure 2, 
and the subsequent six predictions made, were based on the premise that subordinates who 
have voice and receive an explanation would outperform those subordinates who have voice 
or explanation only or neither voice or explanation.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Predicted relationships between voice, explanation and mean performance within 
experimental conditions. Source: Libby (1999, p.128). 
 
 
Originally, Libby (1996) advocated more specific propositions. Firstly, Libby (1996) 
expected there to be a voice main effect and an explanation main effect based on the findings 
of the previous research discussed above. Neither was found. Secondly, the voice/explanation 
group was expected to outperform the voice/no explanation group. Bies and Shapiro (1988) 
demonstrated that once individuals are asked to be involved in a particular decision through 
the voice process, they expect either the superior‟s final decision to reflect the views they 
expressed or to receive a reasonable explanation for their lack of influence. This prediction 
was supported. Thirdly, Libby (1996) also expected that the voice/explanation group would 
outperform the no voice/no explanation group. This predication was examining whether or 
not the assignment of a voice and an explanation during the decision process combined with a 
budget-based incentive contract results in higher performance than the assignment of a 
budget-based incentive contract alone. An individual receiving no voice and no explanation is 
relying solely on the budget-based incentive contract to motivate their performance. The 
importance of an incentive contract in improving performance was demonstrated by Waller 
and Chow (1985). This prediction was also supported.  
 
The hypothesis advanced by Libby (1999) that is being replicated in this study is as follows:  
 
H1: When subordinates are given a voice in the budgeting process, but voice does not lead 
to influence over the final budget allocation that is made, those subordinates who also 
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receive an explanation for their lack of influence over the budget will have higher 
performance than those who do not receive such an explanation. 
 
A key finding in the budget literature is the negative consequences on performance of pseudo-
participation (Pasewark and Welker, 1990).  Argyris (1952) defines a pseudo-participative 
process as one in which the subordinates are led to believe that they have influence over the 
budget that is set, but in reality their input is ignored.  Pseudo-participation would result when 
the subjects were given a voice that did not influence the final budget set. It would be 
therefore expected that performance would decrease in such circumstances. However, as 
argued and found by Libby (1996; 1999) the receipt of an explanation for the unfair budget 
contains any negative consequences of an uninfluential voice.  
 
This conflict in the literature could be resolved by examining a single budget period versus a 
multiple budget period setting. Libby‟s study was conducted in a single budget period. 
Realistically the budgeting process occurs more than once and therefore it seems sensible to 
study the effects of voice and explanation over multiple budget periods. 
 
It is argued here that in a multiple budget period setting the pseudo-participation effect on 
performance would outweigh any explanation effects. That is, over a number of budget 
periods the continual rejection of voice so that there is no influence on the final budget 
allocation would over time lead to the de-motivating effects as described under the pseudo-
participation phenomenon. This would occur despite the receipt of an explanation. Interviews 
with managers suggest that they would rather be given a budget allocation to work within 
then spend hours researching, deciding and drawing together plans and projects with an 
accompanying budget only to have it cutback or rejected. A one time budget cut back with an 
accompanying suitable explanation may not impact motivation. However, to have the cutback 
year in and year out would lead to frustration at the process of requiring managers to submit 
budgets rather then being given budget allocations to work within. 
 
The primary theoretical framework behind the explanation effect is the work titled 
interactional justice by Bies (1987), Greenberg (1990a, 1991) Bies and Moag (1986) and Bies 
and Shapiro (1987, 1988). In short this research has found that interactional considerations 
were more highly regarded then procedural or distributive considerations when analysing 
perceived fairness (Bies and Shapiro, 1987). This research first demonstrated that providing 
an explanation for an unfavourable event has a positive effect on perceived fairness. This is 
due to the significance placed on interpersonal communication and treatment during the 
enactment of the procedures (Bies & Shapiro, 1987). That is, the explanation eliminates a 
“worst case reading” of the decision makers intentions and provides an excuse or justification 
as to why the decision had to be as indicated. Compared to no explanation being provided 
which may signal a message that the unfavourable decision was deliberate (Bies & Shapiro, 
1988). 
 
Additionally, the research highlighted the profound effect the explanation has on perceived 
fairness. Greenberg (1991) insists that actually behaving fairly and convincing others of ones 
fairness is unrelated. That is, the perceived fairness of outcomes is often unrelated to the level 
of those outcomes but on the explanation received. He names this the impression management 
process (Greenberg, 1990a). Bies et al (1988) also demonstrate that an explanation that was 
reasonable and sincerely presented led workers to accept negative outcomes. 
 
Greenberg (1991) argues that this is due to the perception that people perceive fairness as 
related to what benefits them and makes them feel good about themselves (Greenberg, 1991, 
p.56). If an interaction includes an explanation that accounts for the unfavourable outcome 
then a greater level of wellbeing and fairness with ensue. 
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Relating the above findings to multiple budget periods, it is postulated here that the continual 
receipt of an unfavourable outcome will impact on the perception of fairness and therefore 
impact on performance.  Anecdotal evidence suggests managers dedicate a lot of resources to 
putting together their budget and are frustrated when cutbacks are required. As demonstrated 
by Libby (1996, 1999) this potential conflict can be eased in a single budget setting with the 
provision of an explanation. However, over time the continual rejection of voice would 
provide a more intense focus on the explanation received. The reasonableness and the 
sincerity of the explanation could be questioned if time and time again there is an expectation 
that a manager submit a budget that is then rejected. Greenberg (1991) states that although an 
explanation generally increases the acceptance of distributive outcomes relative to no 
explanation there is a potential that explanations could be unravelled to reveal manipulative or 
artificial behaviour that could cause negative reactions.  
 
Reflecting the discussion above, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: Individuals given the opportunity to voice an opinion in a budgeting process that 
continually does not lead to influence over any of the final budget allocations, despite 
receiving an explanation, will encounter decreasing performance over time. 
 
One positive factor of receiving an explanation is the information received by the individual 
that the decision maker at least provided thought to the decision at hand and came to a careful 
judgement. A supervisor not issuing an explanation may have considered all the relevant 
details and came to a judgement just as carefully as a supervisor that did issue an explanation, 
however, the non-receipt of an explanation may give the individual the impression that 
appropriate time and thought was not given to the budget request and therefore the budget 
allocation is unfair.  Greenberg‟s (1991) impression management theory suggests that giving 
an explanation improves perceptions of fairness. However, although there is support for the 
giving of an explanation to improve perceived fairness of an unfavourable outcome, there is 
also some acceptance that not all explanations would rate equally. To examine this issue 
empirically it was decided to test the effect of giving simply the same explanation as opposed 
to different explanations at each budget time period. It is argued here that over multiple 
budget periods giving the same explanation would produce similar feelings within individuals 
as if no explanation was given. That is, if the same explanation was given time and time again 
a manager may become increasing sceptical of the explanation‟s reasonableness and sincerity. 
Reasonableness and sincerity are two factors that help shape an effective explanation (Bies et 
al, 1988). The same explanation at every budget period may actually be genuine and valid. 
However, as Greenberg (1987; 1991) has argued, the actual fact is not as important as the 
appearance.  The simple use of the previous period‟s explanation may give the impression 
that the supervisor had not devoted the appropriate time and effort to considering the 
manager‟s budget request. 
 
Again, reflecting the discussion above, the final hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H3: Over time, when individuals are given the opportunity to voice an opinion in a 
budgeting process which continually does not lead to influence over any of the final budget 
allocations, those who receive a different explanation for their lack of influence will 
perform better than those who receive the same explanation. 
 
Covariates 
Libby (1996, 1999) suggests that prior research shows that locus of control and performance 
capability have the potential to influence subject‟s performance independently of the effect of 
voice and explanation. To ensure replication to Libby‟s study these two variables were also 
included in this study as covariates.  
 
Locus of control is defined as an individual‟s perception of the degree of control they have 
over events in their lives (Rotter 1966). An internally orientated individual believes that they 
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have some control over events in their life. While, an externally orientated individual believes 
that events are beyond their control and are controlled by fate, luck or powerful others. 
Sweeney, McFarlin and Cotton (1991) discovered that individual‟s perceptions of procedural 
justice when given the opportunity to voice an opinion were moderated by that individual‟s 
locus of control. In addition, Brownell (1982), Frucot and Shearon (1991) and Kren (1992) 
found that internally oriented individuals performed better when participating in budget 
setting then did externally oriented individuals. The results of these studies suggest that 
subjects categorised as internally oriented may react more positively to the opportunity for 
voice than would those subjects categorised as externally oriented. 
 
Performance Capability is operationally defined as a subject‟s level of task performance on a 
pre-contracting trial (Waller and Chow 1985). Conceptually, performance capability is 
defined as the subjects‟ skill at a task multiplied by their motivation to perform. In other 
words, performance capability captures both skill and effort. Waller and Chow (1985) argue 
that the use of performance capability as a proxy for skill alone is justified in practice if the 
task allows the subjects to compensate for low skill by exerting greater effort. This was 
supported by Libby (1996), where it was found that while self-efficacy may matter to one‟s 
fairness judgement in theory, it did not appear to matter in practice. It is therefore appropriate 
for this study to measure performance capability based on skill alone.  
 
 
3. Research method 
Data was collected for this study using a laboratory experiment. The task, the incentive 
contract (fixed pay plus bonus) and the conduct of the experiment was similar to Libby (1996, 
1999). A comparison of the laboratory experiment with that of Libby is shown in Table 1. 
The main difference was the extended work time of groups four and five to allow testing of 
hypotheses two and three. 
 
Table 1 
Experiment Comparison with Libby (1996 & 1999) 
 
 This Study Libby (1996, 1999) 
Task Decoding of Symbols 
Incentive Contract Fixed-pay-plus-bonus 
Earning of Tickets 
Prize per group $230 worth of goods $150 cash 
Independent 
Variables 
Voice 
Explanation 
Trial 
Explanation Type 
Voice 
Explanation 
Dependent 
Variable 
H1: Work Period Performance 
H2&3: Work Period Performance 
adjusted for the Budget Goal 
Work Period Performance 
Covariate 
Variables 
Locus of Control 
Performance Capability 
Subjects  83 Undergraduate Business 
Students 
 Voluntary 
 Conducted outside class 
 Allocated to groups based on 
their time available 
 Conducted in 5 groups of 
approx 16 subjects 
 Males (45%); Females (55%) 
 171 Undergraduate Business 
Students 
 Voluntary 
 Conducted in class 
 Allocated to groups based on 
class time attended  
 Conducted in 8 groups of 
approx. 20 subjects 
 Males (49%); Females (51%) 
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 Mean: 
- months work experience – 36 
- no. of accounting courses – 1 
 Mean: 
- months work experience – 33 
- no. of accounting courses - 1 
Location Australia Canada 
Symbol Budget H1: 200 
H2 & 3 for trials 1-4: 190, 215, 195, 
210 
H1: 200 
Incentive Contract If actual > budget : Payment = 3 tickets + 2 tickets x (actual 
             symbols decoded – symbol budget) 
If actual < budget: 3 tickets 
 
 
The experiment called for a 2x2 between subjects‟ factorial design for testing hypothesis one 
and a 2 x 4 within-subjects factorial design for hypotheses two and three. For the purpose of 
this study, five groups were formed. For testing hypothesis one, group one represented the no 
voice/no explanation cell, group two represented the no voice/explanation cell, group three 
represented the voice/no explanation cell and a random selection of subjects from groups four 
and five represented the voice/explanation cell. It was necessary to take a random sample of 
subjects from groups four and five to ensure comparable cell sizes. Group four represented 
the same explanation cell and group five represented the different explanation cell for the 
testing of hypotheses two and three. The experimental design is summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Experimental Design 
 
Hypothesis One 
Effect: No Voice Voice 
No Explanation Cell 1 (Group 1) Cell 3 (Group 3) 
Explanation Cell 2 (Group 2) Cell 4 (Groups 4 & 5) 
Hypotheses Two and Three 
 
Effect: 
Between-Subjects Factor 
Same Explanation 
(Group 4) 
Different Explanation 
(Group 5) 
Within-Subjects Factor   
Cells 1 – 4 
 
Cells 5 – 8 
Trials One – Four 
 
3.1 Subjects 
A total of 101 students volunteered to participate in this experiment. Students were assigned 
randomly to the groups after consideration of their time commitment (that is, whether 
available for one hour only, four hours only, or either) and their time available (that is, which 
days and times available). This semi-random process led to 93 students being assigned to 
groups. However, the final number of students that undertook the experiment was 83, 16 
subjects in groups one, two and four, 17 subjects in group three and 18 subjects in group five. 
As mentioned above, for the purposes of testing hypothesis one, 16 subjects were randomly 
selected from groups four and five to form the voice/explanation cell. In order to make the 
analysis more robust against heteroskedasticity it was decided to make each cell uniform in 
size (Shavelson 1996). Sixteen was selected as the cell size as this was the minimum number 
of subjects in any of the groups. 
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Demographic data was collected and compared to ensure that there were no systematic 
differences across groups. One-way analyses of variances (ANOVAs) showed that there were 
no differences with respect to gender, year in course, months of part or full time work 
experience or number of accounting courses studied. The demographic data of the subjects in 
this study was also similar to the subjects in the Libby study. 
 
3.2 Subjects Compensation 
Subjects worked at the experimental task to earn raffle tickets that granted them a chance in 
winning a prize valued at approximately $230. The incentive structure was in the form of a 
fixed-pay-plus-bonus compensation scheme and was designed so that the more symbols a 
subject decoded, the more tickets they earned. The incentive structure was that followed by 
Libby (1996, 1999) and adopted from Waller and Chow (1985). Kren (1992) successfully 
used a similar budget-based incentive scheme. There was one prize per group for the first 
work period, so that the subjects were given an equal opportunity to win a prize. That is, all 
five groups were under the same incentive structure for work period one. Further prizes were 
offered to groups 4 and 5 during the subsequent trials. This was necessary to ensure the 
subjects operated under similar conditions from one work period to the next. The prizes were 
drawn by a raffle.  
 
Subjects were paid a set rate of one ticket for every 25 symbols correctly decoded during the 
practice period. For the work period the fixed-pay-plus-bonus compensation scheme used was 
operationalised as shown in Table 1. 
 
The symbol budget set by Libby was 200. Recall that Libby (1999) wanted to present a 
budget the subordinates perceived as unfair so as to focus their attention on the budget 
process. She defined an unfair budget as one “that is more difficult to achieve than the one 
they request” (1999, p.127). Libby pre-tested the experimental task and performance ranged 
from 117 to 177 symbols with a mean of 146 symbols (Libby, 1996). She selected 200 
symbols as the budget, stating that this was difficult but attainable.  
 
The pre-test in this study produced similar results (range: 96-165, mean: 133) to Libby and 
therefore the symbol budget of 200 was deemed appropriate to produce similar perceptions of 
fairness, motivation and commitment for the subjects in this study. The subsequent budgets 
used for the trials in testing hypotheses two and three were set within a maximum 10% 
deviation of this 200-symbol standard. The symbol budgets for trials one to four were 190, 
215, 195 and 210 respectively. It was necessary to alter the symbol budget over trials to 
promote the sincerity of the process and the explanations given. The degree of variation, 
however, was small enough to ensure a similar standard across the different trials. 
 
3.3 Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in this study were voice, explanation, explanation type and 
trial number. The voice and explanation variables were used for testing hypothesis one. For 
testing hypothesis two and three the voice and explanation variables were held constant. That 
is, all subjects received a voice and explanation. The manipulation required conducting the 
experimental task over a number of trials and on altering the explanation type. 
 
Voice was defined as the opportunity for subordinates to be involved in the decision process 
by communicating their views to their superiors (Leventhal 1980). All groups were told the 
symbol budget. In the voice conditions, subjects were then given the opportunity to 
communicate their preferred budget to the superior. However, subjects in the no voice 
conditions were not given this opportunity.  
 
An explanation was defined as a justification provided by the superior when the final budget 
outcome was not affected by the subordinates‟ communicated preferences (Bies 1987). 
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Explanation was operationalised as a written justification given for the subordinates‟ lack of 
influence over the final budget set. The explanation used for testing hypothesis one was the 
same as that used by Libby (1996, 1999) and was only given to subjects under the explanation 
condition. 
 
Explanation type was operationalised at two levels: the same explanation and a different 
explanation. In the same explanation condition, subjects were given the same explanation as 
to why their input into the budget process (voice) lacked influence for each trial. The 
explanation used was the same as that used for testing hypothesis one. In the different 
explanation condition, there were different explanations given at each trial.  The different 
explanations developed were based on Bies et al. (1988), who put forward a number of 
different explanation types, including budgetary constraints, restrictions due to company 
policy, inconsistent company norms, limitations due to organisational politics, controls 
imposed at higher levels of management and claims of incompetence. Appendix one presents 
the explanations used.  
 
The first explanation was concerned with budgetary constraints by arguing that a minimum 
budget requirement had to be met by the subject. The second explanation implied restrictions 
due to company policy by arguing that the university policy (specifically, fairness and equity 
policies) restricted the final budget set. The third explanation was based on inconsistent 
company norms through the referral to a normal standard of performance. The final 
explanation applied claims of incompetence by stating that the subjects‟ work performance 
was below that of fellow workers, and that their poor work rate (incompetence) was driving 
the final budget. For an explanation to be considered as adequate, it needs to be logical, 
sincere (Bies and Shapiro 1987; Bies et al. 1988; Greenberg 1990b) and informationally valid 
(Greenberg 1993). The explanations were considered logical as they claimed that the final 
budget set was based on the performance of all workers. Sincerity of the explanations was 
inferred by the reference to the difficulty of achieving the final budget. All explanations were 
considered informationally valid by referring to previous work periods as a benchmark for 
setting the budget. Additionally, the subjects observed the checking of information and the 
double-checking of calculations for accuracy by an independent reviewer. According to 
Greenberg (1993) this reinforces informational validity. Each subject in the different 
explanation condition received each explanation only once. The order in which each subject 
received each of the different explanations was random. Consequently, each trial had all of 
the different explanations being distributed. 
 
The final variable was trial which was a within subjects variable. There were four trials in 
which the subjects performed the decoding task. Due to the limited number of students a 
control group was not used. The internal validity threat of maturation was addressed by 
changing the symbols used at each trial to combat learning, supplying two refreshment breaks 
to combat fatigue and boredom and by reinforcement of the incentive. Changing the symbols 
was deemed necessary to discourage memorising of the symbols. The simple nature of the 
decoding task remained the same and therefore the likely effect of student judgements about 
their ability to meet the budget would be minimal. Also, to ensure the validity of the various 
explanations, the assigned budget was altered at each trial. This alteration was kept to a 
minimum (+/-10% of the original 200 symbols) so that no matter which explanation the 
subjects received, the explanation was still considered to be sincere. However, given the 
threat of a goal effect the work period performance was controlled for the budget assigned in 
the statistical analysis. 
 
3.4 Covariates 
Performance capability was measured as the number of symbols correctly decoded during the 
practice period. Locus of Control was measured using Rotter‟s (1966) locus of control 
instrument that provides a score between 0 – 23 with the higher score representing an external 
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locus of control personality. Descriptive statistics for this study, as well as Libby‟s study, are 
presented in Table 3. 
 
3.5 Dependent Variable 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. The dependent variable for hypothesis one was 
measured using the subjects‟ work period performance (number of symbols correctly 
decoded).  
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Range 
Performance 
Capability 
This study 
Libby (1996, 1999) 
108.98 
130 
23.42 
30.11 
58 - 161 
66 - 227 
Locus of Control This study 
Libby (1996, 1999) 
11.09 
12.3 
3.8 
3.11 
2 - 21 
4 - 21 
H1: Work 
Performance 
This study 
Libby (1996, 1999) 
143 
175.63 
34.74 
46.71 
81 - 252 
86 - 318 
H2 & H3: 
Work Performance 
prior to budget 
goal adjustment 
This study:    
Trial one 107.81 21.31 73-149 
Trial two 137.97 33.35 71-175 
Trial three 129.00 26.89 84.175 
Trial four 145.69 36.75 85-216 
 
For hypotheses two and three the dependent variable was work period performance adjusted 
for the budget goal assigned. The adjustment of the budget goal assigned was necessary to 
control for any goal effect. Goal-setting theory states that, assuming commitment to the stated 
goal; difficult goals should induce more effort and consequently better performance than easy 
goals (Murray 1990). In other words, goal-setting theory advocates that establishing difficult 
goals will induce more effort and consequently better performance than moderate or easy 
goals (Locke et al. 1981). To control for the budget assigned, the work performance of each 
subject was altered to compensate for the difference in the budget. That is, the budget 
assigned at each trial was subtracted from the subjects‟ work performance. This changed the 
work performance variable into the subjects‟ deviation from the assigned budget.   
 
3.6 Experimental procedure 
The experiment took place over a 10-day period. The experiment time was approximately 45 
minutes for groups one to three and three hours for groups four and five. To control for 
leakage of information, subjects were asked not to discuss the experiment with any other 
students. Groups four and five were provided with two breaks where refreshments were 
provided so as to reduce any effects of fatigue. All groups were treated in a similar manner; 
with the subjects reading the instructions. No additional information was given to the 
subjects. 
 
Figure 3 depicts a flowchart of the procedures undertaken. Subjects acted as subordinates 
performing a production task. The production task consisted of the translation of symbols into 
alphabetical characters using a decoding key. This task was used by Libby (1996, 1999) and 
adopted from Chow (1983) and Waller and Chow (1985).
2
 There were four parts to the 
experiment for testing hypothesis one: practice period, work period, manipulation check 
questions and questionnaires measuring locus of control and demographic data. Groups one, 
two and three (no voice/no explanation, no voice/explanation, voice/no explanation) 
underwent these parts in that order. Groups four and five also undertook the practice period 
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the work period and the manipulation check questions, but did not complete the 
questionnaires until after all work periods (trials) had been completed. The experimental 
procedures for testing hypothesis one followed that of Libby (1996, 1999). Subjects were 
given booklets that corresponded to the different parts of the study. A description of the task, 
decoding sheet and a practice work sheet were contained in the first booklet. The subjects 
completed a five minute practice period. The subjects were then given the answer key to 
check their work and were required to enter the number of correctly decoded symbols on a 
tally sheet. The tally sheet was reviewed by the manager and was checked by the assistant 
while subjects moved on to read the instructions in the second booklet. The second booklet 
contained the incentive scheme, the work period decoding key and work sheets. The 
instructions of the incentive scheme included practice examples to ensure that subjects 
understood how raffle tickets would be issued.   
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Experimental Procedures 
 
For the five minute work period subjects in the no voice conditions were assigned a budget 
goal of 200 symbols. Subjects in the no voice/explanation condition were also given an 
explanation as to why the 200 budget goal was assigned. The subjects in the voice conditions 
Same explanation 
 
*Subjects fill out 
response page with 
preferred budget 
*New budget assigned 
*same explanation 
given at each trial 
*4 additional trials 
*Group 4 
*Group size: 16  
Work on decoding task for each trial. 
Fill out manipulation check questionnaires after each trial. 
Fill out demographic data questionnaire at the end of the fourth trial. 
Incentive scheme described and 
tentative budget set at 200 symbols by the manager. 
No voice/ 
No explanation 
*200-symbol 
budget assigned 
*Group 1 
*Group size:  
  16 subjects 
No voice/ 
Explanation 
*200-symbol 
budget assigned 
*explanation 
given 
*Group 2 
*Group size:  
  16 subjects 
Voice/ 
No explanation 
*Subjects fill out 
response card with 
preferred budget 
*200-symbol 
budget assigned 
*Group 3 
*Group size:  
  17 subjects 
 
Voice/Explanation 
*Subjects fill out 
response card with 
preferred budget 
*200-symbol 
budget assigned 
*explanation given 
*Groups 4&5  
*Group size: 
  34 subjects 
Fill out questionnaires on manipulation check questions, locus of 
control and demographic data (demographic data was not collected 
for voice/explanation groups). 
Work on decoding task for 5 minutes. 
Different explanations 
 
*Subjects fill out 
response page with 
preferred budget 
*New budget assigned 
*different explanation 
given at each trial 
*4 additional trials 
*Group 5 
*Group size: 18 
 
Underwent a 
further four work 
periods (trials) 
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were required to enter their preferred budget goal on a response card. The response cards 
were collected and reviewed and subjects were handed a sheet indicating that the budget goal 
would remain at 200 symbols. In the voice/explanation condition subjects also received the 
same explanation as in the no voice/explanation condition as to why the budget remained at 
200 symbols. After completing the five minute work period subjects in groups one, two and 
three completed the locus of control and demographic questionnaire. Subjects in groups four 
and five completed a further four work periods.  
 
Each work period was similar to that described above. After the subjects were given their 
performance score from their previous work period, all subjects were asked to indicate on a 
response card their preferred budget goal for the next work period. The response cards were 
collected and reviewed. The subjects were then handed a sheet indicating the budget goal for 
the next 5 minute work period and an explanation as to why the budget goal had to remain at 
the initially indicated level. The subjects in the same explanation group were given the same 
explanation at each work period and the subjects in the different explanation group received a 
different explanation at each work period.  
 
The researchers playing the roles of manager and assistant led all experimental sessions. All 
subjects were invited to a final session, which was scheduled to provide feedback to the 
subjects about their performance, to explain the purpose of the experiment and to conduct the 
draw for the prizes. There was an atmosphere of excitement at this final session as students 
were keen to know their performance and to find out the winners of the prizes. The odds of 
winning a prize per group were the same as for Libby however the prize was different. Libby 
had a cash prize of $150 per group compared to this study where the prize was $230 worth of 
goods. It is hard to determine whether the subjects in each study valued the prizes equally, 
however, part of the $230 prize was a 3 month gym membership worth $150. Student 
comments indicated that was highly sought after and was the impetus for them volunteering 
for the study.  
 
An analysis of questions from the post-experimental questionnaire show no significant 
difference between groups with respect to the motivation of the prize, however the analysis 
showed that the effectiveness of the incentive scheme was greater for the no 
voice/explanation group compared to all other groups. Libby (1996; 1999) did not report 
these results so no comparison could be made.  
 
4. Results 
4.1 Hypothesis one 
To test hypothesis one, which was a replication of Libby (1999), a 2 (voice/no voice) x 2 (no 
explanation/explanation) between subjects analysis of covariance was performed with locus 
of control and performance capability as covariates. The dependent variable was work period 
performance. 
 
Assumptions of linearity and homogeneity of regression were met; however, tests revealed 
that the work period performance variable was skewed with a peak (leptokurtic) shape. The 
non-normal distribution appeared to be driven by two outliers.
3
 Given that these values were 
extreme and not just part of a long tail of a skewed distribution, it appeared rational to remove 
them from the analysis (Hamilton 1990). Further given that the values are far above the 
budget set, the perception of an unfair budget may not exist for these two subjects. The values 
(248 and 252) were within the no voice/explanation group. Libby (1996) who attempted to 
remove the outliers from her analysis also supported this notion. However, in the case of 
Libby (1996), there were 47 (27.5%) outliers which, once removed, resulted in a loss of 
statistical power. It is unknown whether these outliers were as extreme as the ones found in 
this study. Given the removal of the two outliers, thus resulting in non-even cell sizes, the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was also conducted. No assumptions were violated.
4
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The results are presented in Table 4
5
 and the cell means, adjusted for locus of control and 
performance capability are shown in Table 5. Table 4 shows that there was no significant 
interaction between voice and explanation affecting performance, however there was a 
significant explanation main effect. This is contrary to the results found by Libby (1999) 
which showed no significant main effects but a significant interaction effect. An inspection of 
the adjusted means in Table 5, show that the no voice/explanation group decoded the most 
symbols, followed by the voice/explanation group, no voice/no explanation group and finally 
the voice/no explanation group decoded the least number of symbols. 
 
To further examine the results t-tests were used to compare means across groups. Although 
the voice/explanation group‟s adjusted mean was higher than the voice/no explanation group 
the difference was not significant, t = .793. This leads to a rejection of hypothesis one. Also, it 
was expected that the voice/explanation condition would significantly outperform the no 
voice/no explanation group. Again the adjusted mean scores were in the right direction but 
were not significant, t = .907. The lack of significance could be due to the small sample size 
rather than the lack of effect.  
 
Table 4 
Analysis of Covariance for Work Performance for Hypothesis One (n = 62) 
 
Source of Variance Adjusted SS df MS F sig 
Voice 1150.344 1 1150.344 2.580 .114 
Explanation 2648.893 1 2648.893 5.941 .018 
Voice x Explanation 926.171 1 926.171 2.077 .155 
Covariates      
     Performance Capability 22679.588 1 22679.588 50.864 .000 
     Locus of Control 526.299 1 526.299 1.180 .282 
Error 24969.663 56 445.887   
R
2
 = 0.523 (Adjusted R
2
 = 0.481) 
 
Table 5 
Work Performance Group Means (Standard Errors) Adjusted for Performance 
Capability and Locus of Control for Hypothesis One (n = 62) 
Effect No Voice Voice Marginal Means 
No Explanation 133.94 (5.30) 
n = 16 
132.96 (5.35) 
n = 16 
133.45 (3.74) 
n=32 
Explanation 154.86 (5.67) 
n = 14 
138.35 (5.28) 
n = 16 
146.61 (3.87) 
n = 30 
Marginal means 144.40 (3.89) 
n = 30 
135.65 (3.76) 
n = 32 
140.23 (2.67) 
n = 62 
 
 
The results do indicate that provision of an explanation is a significant factor affecting 
performance. That is, when subordinates have no influence over the final budget that is set 
(regardless of voice) the provision of an explanation is crucial for performance improvement.   
This result supports previous researchers who found significant explanation main effects on 
fairness and performance (Bies 1987; Bies and Shapiro 1987, 1988; Greenberg 1990a, 1991; 
Williams 1999). Libby (1996) did in fact expect an explanation main effect on performance.  
 
Understanding the difference between this study and Libby provides insight into the 
generalisability of the voice and explanation variables. A comparison of the mean work 
performance (see Table 3) between this study and Libby shows that the mean work 
performance in the Libby study was closer to the set budget of 200. In fact for Libby‟s study 
the budget of 200 was approximately half a standard deviation away from the mean compared 
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to this study in which the budget was almost two standard deviations away from the mean. 
This suggests that although the 200 symbol budget was technically the same under both 
studies, it could have had differing effects for the subjects in each study. The research setting 
required an unfair budget so that subjects would concentrate on the process. The range values 
in Libby (1996, 1999) show a highest score of 318 which is well beyond the 200 budget. This 
together with the number of outliers could suggest that the budget goal of 200 symbols was 
not difficult and therefore the subjects didn‟t perceive the budget as unfair which in turn did 
not turn their attention to the process. In fact some subjects may have voiced 200 symbols or 
greater as their suggested budget. This could explain the lack of expected explanation main 
effects.  
 
The hypothesis proposed rests on the issue of fairness. If the budget allocation is unfair then 
giving a voice and an explanation should reduce the perception of unfairness. Following 
Libby this study also tested subject‟s perceptions of fairness by asking subjects to indicate on 
a scale from one (completely unfair) to five (completely fair) “How fair would you judge the 
procedures used to set the budget assigned to you?” and “How fair would you judge the final 
budget itself?”. Average mean ratings across the two questions for each group and overall is 
presented in Table 6. Libby‟s results are also included for comparison. 
 
Table 6 
Mean Rating of Fairness, Commitment and Level of Influence 
 NV/NE NV/E V/NE V/E Overall 
Fairness:      
This study 2.86 
(1.19) 
3.33 
(0.79) 
2.67 
(0.97) 
3.03 
(1.16) 
2.97 
(1.04) 
Libby (1996; 
1999) 
3.54 
(0.16) 
3.41 
(0.15) 
3.18 
(0.16) 
3.7 
(0.17) 
3.45 
(1.17) 
Commitment:      
This study 3.6 
(.85) 
4.03 
(1.32) 
3.46 
(1.45) 
3.96 
(0.77) 
3.77 
(1.13) 
Libby (1996)     4.06 
(1.13) 
Influence:      
This study 2.04 
(1.3) 
2.03 
(0.98) 
1.68 
(0.78) 
2.66 
(1.27) 
2.10 
(1.14) 
Libby     Not reported 
 
 
The results show that the subject‟s perceptions of fairness follow the same pattern as 
performance. That is, subjects in the no voice/explanation group recorded a higher level of 
perceived fairness and also performed the highest. Subjects in the voice/no explanation group 
recorded the lowest level of perceived fairness and also performed the worst. Overall, subjects 
in this study had a lower perception of fairness than subjects in the study conducted by Libby. 
This also mirrors the subject‟s performance across the two studies.  
 
This suggests that performance is related to perceptions of fairness and specifically the higher 
the perception of fairness the higher the performance. What is less clear is the reason for the 
difference in results from Libby‟s study and this study and what consequence this has on the 
theory. As indicated above Libby‟s subjects may not have viewed the budget allocation as 
unfair, thus not leading to an emphasis on the process. There is some dispute surrounding the 
concept of an unfair budget. Lindquist (1995) views an unfair budget as one that is 
unattainable, whereas Libby viewed an unfair budget as one that is unfavourable but 
attainable. Despite this conflict in definition, what the results do suggest is that the research 
setting is sensitive to the budget set and that conflicting results between this study, Libby and 
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previous studies could be explained within the definition and operationalisation of an unfair 
budget. 
 
Libby (1996) also examined commitment by asking respondents to indicate from one (not at 
all committed) to five (fully committed) “How committed were you to meeting or exceeding 
the final budget assigned to you by the manager?” Her mean score together with the results 
from this study on the same question are presented in Table 6. The results show that the level 
of commitment also follows the same pattern as perceived fairness and performance. That is, 
the higher the commitment, the higher the perceived fairness and the higher the performance. 
Libby (1996) also found that commitment was correlated with fairness and performance. This 
variable was examined due to suggestions that fairness effects performance through its effect 
on commitment (Cropanzano & Folger, 1991). 
 
The final variable presented in Table 6 shows the level of perceived influence the subjects felt 
they had over the final budget that was set. This was measured as the average score on a scale 
of one (low input/low degree of influence) to five (high input/high degree of influence). The 
scale included the following questions: “How much input were you able to give in the process 
of setting the final budget?” and “How much influence do you feel that you had over the final 
budget that was set?” The results indicate that overall subjects felt their influence was low 
(mean = 2.1; sd = 1.14). Those in the no voice conditions recorded similar perceptions of 
influence, while the voice/no explanation group felt the least amount of influence and the 
voice/explanation group felt the most amount of influence. Intuitively this result is as 
expected and provides some evidence to suggest that the subjects were affected by the voice 
and explanation process. 
 
It is worth emphasising the finding that the no voice groups decoded more symbols than the 
voice groups. Although this difference was not significant, it does suggest that when a voice 
has an uninfluential impact or an unfair budget is intended, participation is likely to lead to 
inferior performance. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis two and three 
Hypothesis two and three were concerned with the affect on performance of the explanation 
over a number of work periods. A mixed design was employed with one between-subjects 
factor (explanation type) and one within-subjects factor (trials). Explanation type had two 
levels (same and different) and trial had four levels. Table 7 contains the work period cell 
means adjusted for locus of control and performance capability. The scores are presented to 
allow comparison to scores presented for hypothesis one testing. The scores were then 
adjusted for the budget target. As discussed previously goal setting theory advocates that 
difficult goals will induce more effort and consequently higher performance then easy goals 
(Locke et al, 1981). Figure 4 graphically presents the cell means for the dependent variable 
(work performance adjusted for the budget goal). 
 
To accept hypotheses two and three the 2 x 4 factorial analysis needed to show a significant 
negative main effect for trial and a significant positive interaction effect of explanation type 
and trial. 
 
Table 7 
Work Performance Group Means (Standard Errors) Adjusted for Performance 
Capability and Locus of Control for Hypothesis Two and Three  (n = 32 x 4 trials) 
Effect 
(Budget Goal) 
Same Explanation 
(n = 16) 
Different Explanation 
(n = 16) 
Marginal Means 
(n = 32) 
Trial One (190) 107.66 (3.21) 107.97 (3.21 107.81 (2.24) 
Trial Two (210) 130.52 (5.17) 145.42 (5.17) 137.97 (3.62) 
Trial Three (195) 119.69 (3.96) 137.75 (3.96) 128.72 (2.77) 
 19 
Trial Four (215) 139.89 (6.02) 151.49 (6.02) 145.69 (4.21) 
Marginal Means 124.44 (3.79) 135.66 (3.79) 130.05 (2.65) 
 
 
The dependent variable was the subjects work period performance deviation from the budget 
goal. A repeated measures analysis of covariance was used and the results are shown in Table 
8. There was no significant main effect for trial and therefore hypothesis two is rejected. 
Figure 4 graphically presents the cell means for the dependent variable. An inspection of 
Figure 4 shows that there was an increase in performance from trial one to three and then a 
decrease in performance for trial four. This may be suggesting that further trials were needed 
to capture the essence of the negative effect expected when a subordinate‟s input is ignored 
time after time. 
 
Table 8 
Repeated Measures Analysis of Covariance for Work Performance Controlled for the 
Budget Assigned for Hypothesis Two and Three (n=32 x 4 trials) 
Source of Variance Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df MS F Sig. 
Covariates:      
    Performance Capability 50404.014 1 50401.014 55.881 .000 
    Locus of Control 1118.505 1 1118.505 1.240 .275 
Between subjects:      
    Explanation Type 3863.172 1 3863.172 4.283 .048 
    Error 25254.105 28 901.932   
Within subjects:      
    Trial 830.495 3 276.832 1.689 .176 
    Trial x Explanation Type 1377.790 3 459.263 2.802 .045 
    Error 13765.910 84 163.880   
 
TRIAL
4321
E
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 M
a
rg
in
a
l 
M
e
a
n
s
-50
-60
-70
-80
-90
Explanation Type
Same
Different
 
Fig. 4. Work Performance Group Means over Trials and Explanation Type Controlled 
for the Budget Assigned and Adjusted for Performance Capability and Locus of Control 
 
The results support hypothesis three by showing that there was a significant positive 
interaction effect of explanation type and trial at the 0.05 level. The group that received a 
different explanation at each trial outperformed those who received the same explanation at 
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each trial.  An examination of figure 4 shows that the different explanation group improved at 
a faster rate then the same explanation group to trial 3. However, their performance decreased 
in trial 4 compared to the same explanation group whose performance levelled in trial 4. This 
is curious and contrary to the hypothesis‟s prediction. It could suggest that the subjects have 
become increasingly sceptical regarding the differing explanations. Insight is provided 
through the examination of the subject‟s perceived fairness throughout the trial. 
 
The perceptions of fairness rating as indicated previously was based on the answer to two 
questions concerning the fairness of the procedures and the fairness of the budget. The scores 
on these questions were summed to give a fairness score. Average mean ratings for 
perceptions of fairness across the two groups over the trials are presented in figure 5. In 
relation to explanation type, a comparison of figures 4 and 5 show that performance and 
perceptions of fairness follow the same pattern. That is, the different explanation group had 
higher performance and higher perceptions of fairness then the same explanation group. This 
supports the notion that perceived fairness and performance are linked.  
 
However, for the variable of trial, the performance and fairness ratings are moving in opposite 
directions. That is, performance improves up to trial 3 and then decreases slightly in trial 4 
whereas perceived fairness decreases to trial 3 and then increases in trial 4.  
 
What are the implications of this for the current study? In hypothesis two it was expected that 
performance would decrease over the duration of the trials. This wasn‟t the case. However, 
perceived fairness did decrease over the trial period. It may be that perceived fairness and 
performance are related but not contemporaneously. That is, the student‟s perceptions of 
fairness shows the immediate impact of the manipulated variables however with performance  
it takes individuals some trials to realise that, although motivated by the prize their ability to 
influence the number of tickets received is minimised due to the unfair budget allocation. 
 
Fig. 5. Perceived Fairness Group Means over Trials and Explanation Type 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
This study set out to examine the effect of voice and explanation on performance over 
multiple budget periods. The theoretical framework utilised was that of organisational justice 
theory. This theory examines the fairness attached to outcomes, procedures and interactions 
of organisational participants. Generally, it espouses the need to ensure fairness to help 
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motivate effort and in turn improve performance (Greenberg, 1987; Bies and Tripp, 1995). 
The purpose of this study was to examine the performance differences across voice 
(procedural justice) and explanation (interactional justice) over a number of budget periods. 
The research process and results highlight several important findings. 
 
Firstly, one of the key contributions of this paper is the empirical support for the relationship 
between perceived fairness and performance. More specifically, the results showed that the 
higher the perceptions of fairness, the higher the performance. In the main, psychological 
research in organisation justice theory assumes this positive relationship between fairness and 
performance. The reliance on this relationship is rarely tested. 
 
Secondly, the results indicate that the provision of an explanation significantly affects 
performance. This supports the arguments put forward by Bies (1987), Bies and Shapiro 
(1987, 1988), and Greenberg (1990a, 1991), who found positive effects of explanation on the 
perceptions of fairness and Bies (1987) and Williams (1999) who found positive effects on 
performance. These results are contrary to Libby (1996, 1999) who did not find an 
explanation main effect on performance.  
 
Thirdly, the research highlights the sensitivity of the budget to the results. Libby(1996)  
relying on Cropanzano and Folger‟s (1991) two component model set out to test the 
difference between the combination of a budget allocation that is unfair and a budget process 
that is fair (voice and explanation) with a combination of a budget allocation that is unfair and 
a budget process that is unfair (voice and explanation).  Giving an unfair budget allocation 
across all conditions was to ensure concentration on the budget process. Although technically 
the budget allocation was the same in this and Libby‟s study, Libby‟s subjects recorded 
higher performance and perceptions of fairness and commitment then the subjects in this 
study. This indicates that the perception of a budget allocation that is unfair differed across 
the two studies.  Interesting, Lindquist (1995) defines an unfair budget as one that is 
unattainable. However, Libby (1996; 1999) defines an unfair budget as one that is 
unfavourable but attainable. The differences in the definitions and in the subsequent 
operationalising of the budget set could help explain the conflicting results. 
 
Fourthly, the process highlighted that statistical usage is paramount in the research process. It 
is difficult to assess whether the lack of explanation significance in Libby‟s (1996, 1999) 
study is due to the problem she encountered with outliers. While arguing for the removal of 
outliers, she did not do this due to a loss of statistical power and thus there is uncertainty as to 
their overall effect. 
 
Fifthly, the operationalising of explanation type as same and different indicated that it is not 
simply a matter of providing an explanation. This supports previous researchers (e.g. 
Greenberg, 1991; Bies et al, 1988) who claim that the delivery of an explanation is all part of 
the impression management process. The impression management process helps eliminate 
concerns of unfairness. It could be argued that different explanations over time helped 
improve the sincerity of the process, especially if subordinates took account of the previous 
explanations used in submitting their voice for a subsequent period. Greenberg (1991) warns 
that there is a risk of negative reactions if individuals view explanations as artificial or 
manipulative. Therefore, there is a need to examine carefully the attributes of an explanation. 
It is possible that explanation could be of a multidimensional nature or as Dubin (1969) would 
describe a summative variable. That is, an explanation could contain many dimensions. Bies 
et al (1988) put forward several explanations and argues that an explanation needs to be 
logical, valid and sincere. Previous research has only explored explanation as a single 
variable. However, further investigation of the effects of explanations over time or of 
different explanations would necessitate an examination of whether the three dimensions, 
logicality, sincerity and validity, can occur at differential rates within each explanation. In this 
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study, all subjects in the different explanation treatment group received, in random order, 
every explanation and therefore this was of little concern. However, if different explanations 
are to be used in different treatments then the multidimensional nature of the variable should 
be investigated. 
 
Finally, the results showed that the manipulation of the voice condition did not significantly 
affect performance. This is in line with Williams (1999) who also didn‟t find a voice main 
affect but did find an explanation main affect. It is worthwhile noting that the subjects in the 
voice conditions on average performed worse than the subjects in the no voice conditions 
with the group that received a voice and no explanation performing the worst. This supports 
Argyris (1952) and Pasewark and Welker (1990) who stated that ignoring input can lead to 
pseudo-participation which de-motivates and lowers performance. In fact the findings suggest 
that if an „unfair budget‟ is intended, participation is likely to lead to inferior performance. 
 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, the importance of replication 
in advancing knowledge has been emphasized (Lindsay and Ehrenberg 1993; Otley et al. 
1994; Otley and Pollanen 2000). Most importantly, this study has added support for the 
argument by Bies (1987) that in the presence of an uninfluential voice, the provision of an 
adequate explanation has a positive effect on subordinate performance.  
 
Additionally, this study attempts to better represent the budgeting process in organisations. 
Firstly, by employing a consultative budget process that does not influence the final budget 
set the research design attempts to mimic the real world of scarce resources. Secondly, the 
budget process is undertaken by most organisations at least yearly. The examination of the 
explanation effect over multiple budget periods is essential to improve our understanding of 
this phenomenon. This study examined two levels of explanation, same and different. Bies et 
al. (1988) contends that not all claims of mitigating circumstances (explanations) are 
perceived as „equal‟ by subordinates. An examination of the different types of explanations 
on performance would be a worthwhile avenue for future research. 
 
A number of limitations apply to the results of this study. As in all experimental studies the 
external validity is the major limitation. The generalisability of the results to practice needs to 
be confirmed through field studies. The use of student subjects as surrogates for managers 
also requires consideration. In this study the students did not need broad knowledge and 
experience to complete the task and a practice period was undertaken giving some assurance 
that the subjects understood the task, thus increasing experimental realism. In relation to 
internal validity, the major limitation was the lack of full randomisation of subjects to the 
experimental treatments. However, comparisons of demographic data did not show any 
significant differences between the groups. Also, the use of a control group for testing 
hypotheses two and three would have strengthened the control over the experimental setting 
giving greater reassurance that the variations were due to the manipulated variables. This 
limitation was a function of the number of subjects available. The sample size also affected 
the strength of the statistical analysis.  
 
Notwithstanding these limitations the study does have important implications for the budget 
setting process in organisations. The sincerity and fairness of the procedures and interactions 
employed in the budget setting process are important organisational considerations. The 
evidence suggests that it is not so much the voice in the budget procedure but the explanation 
that can enhance performance.  
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Appendix 
 Explanation types 
 
Explanation used for testing Hypothesis One and for the Same Explanation Condition for Hypothesis 
Two. 
The manager would like to provide you with the following explanation for finalising the budget at ____ 
symbols. Although the manager is aware that this final budget may be difficult to reach, this budget 
was set based on a review of performance during the practice period and on performance of previous 
groups of students on the decoding task. This budget has been assigned in order to challenge even the 
most skilled participant in the study. The calculations made to arrive at this number have been 
reviewed and were double-checked for accuracy against the information about the practice session 
results recorded on the Manager‟s Report. No errors were detected. 
 
Explanations used for the Different Explanation Condition for Hypothesis Two. 
1. Your opinion regarding the budget of 190 symbols has been carefully considered. However, to 
keep up with the manager‟s needs and maintain a level consistent with other workers; you must 
fulfil the budget requirement. Therefore, you have to meet a budget of at least 190 symbols. 
Therefore, the budget is finalised at ____ symbols. 
 
Although this final budget may be difficult to achieve, it was determined based on a review of the 
performance of all workers. This budget should challenge even the most skilled person in the 
group. The calculations made for all workers during their previous work periods have been 
reviewed and were double-checked for accuracy by an independent reviewer. No errors were 
detected. 
 
2. Your opinion regarding the budget of 190 symbols has been carefully considered. However, due to 
the university policy (specifically, fairness and equity policies regarding the dispensing of tickets), 
the budget needs to be finalised at ___ symbols. 
 
Although this final budget may be difficult to achieve, it was determined based on a review of the 
performance of all workers. This budget should challenge even the most skilled person in the 
group. The calculations made for all workers during their previous work periods have been 
reviewed and were double-checked for accuracy by an independent reviewer. No errors were 
detected. 
 
3. Your opinion regarding the budget of 190 symbols has been carefully considered. The normal 
performance for this type of task is regarded to be ___ symbols. Therefore, this budget is finalised 
at ____ symbols. 
 
Although this final budget may be difficult to achieve, it was determined based on a review of the 
performance of all workers. This budget should challenge even the most skilled person in the 
group. The calculations made for all workers during their previous work periods have been 
reviewed and were double-checked for accuracy by an independent reviewer. No errors were 
detected. 
 
4. Your opinion regarding the budget of 190 symbols has been carefully considered. Compared to 
other workers, your performance in previous work periods demonstrates that you have not been 
working at your optimum level. Due to your poor work rate, the budget will be finalised at ___ 
symbols. 
 
Although this final budget may be difficult to achieve, it was determined based on a review of the 
performance of all workers. This budget should challenge even the most skilled person in the 
group. The calculations made for all workers during their previous work periods have been 
reviewed and were double-checked for accuracy by an independent reviewer. No errors were 
detected. 
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Notes
                                                 
1
 In this study the distributive justice dimension was held as a constant in the experimental design by 
giving every subject the same incentive performance contract. 
2
  The materials relating to the experimental task can be obtained from the first author.  
3
 Another explanation for the non-normal distribution of the work performance variable could be that 
the variable is actually a Poisson distribution. That is, the cell variances are functions of the cell means: 
the larger the mean, the larger the variance (Winer, Brown & Michels, 1991). For this distribution, the 
data needs to undergo a square-root transformation. Once a square-root transformation was performed 
on this data the distribution was normal (skewness = 0.209, kurtosis = 0.450). However, the two 
outliers were still present. For the purpose of comparability to Libby (1999), the data was not 
transformed but the outliers were removed. Further investigation was undertaken into the effects of 
square-root transformation on the results. The ANCOVA was also run on this data. The results were 
similar to the actual testing reported. 
4
 Normality: The skewness statistic (0.218), kurtosis (-0.357), Boxplot, histogram and normal 
probability plots supported normality. 
Linearity: Matrix scatterplots containing work period performance, practice period performance and 
locus of control for each group were examined. 
Homogeneity of Regression: Comparison of the full regression model, including interactions between 
the covariates and the treatments, to the reduced regression model resulted in an insignificant result, 
F(4.52)=0.8509, p>0.05. 
Homogeneity of Variances: The Levene‟s test was  insignificant, F(3.58)=0.711, p=0.555) thus 
indicating that the population variances are approximately equal. 
Independence of covariates and treatments: Performance capability was measured prior to the 
treatment. Locus of control was measured after the treatment and therefore a contingency table 
containing two levels of locus of control and four categories corresponding to the four cells of the 
experiment was examined. Locus of control was found to be independent of the treatment, 2 (3) = 
3.338, p = 0.342. 
5
 To test the randomness of the selection of 16 subjects from groups 4 and 5 for cell 4 the statistical 
analysis was also conducted on the 81 responses and the results were similar. The Levene‟s test statistic 
[F(3, 77) = 1.265, p=0.292] was insignificant and thus the homogeneity of variance assumption was not 
violated. 
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